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ABSTRACT In the recent years, the vulnerabilities of conventional public key infrastructure are exposed
by the real-world attacks, such as the certificate authority’s single-point-of-failure or clients’ private
information leakage. Aimed at the first issue, one type of approach is that multiple entities are introduced
to assist the certificate operations, including registration, update, and revocation. However, it is inefficient
in computation. Another type is to make the certificate information publicly visible by bringing in the log
servers. Nevertheless, the data synchronization among log servers may lead to network latency. Based on
the second approach, the blockchain-based public key infrastructure schemes are proposed. Through these
type of schemes, all the certificate operations are stored in the blockchain for public audit. However, the issue
of revoked certificates’ status storage is worth paying attention, especially in the setting with massive
certificates. In addition, the target web server that a client wants to access is exposed in the process of
certificate status validation. In this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving blockchain-based certificate status
validation scheme called PBCert to solve these two issues. First, we separate the revoked certificates control
and storage plane. Only the minimal control information (namely, certificate hashes and related operation
block height) is stored in the blockchain and it uses external data stores for the detailed information about
all revoked certificates. Second, we design an obscure response to the clients’ certificate status query for
the purpose of privacy preserving. Through the security analysis and experiment evaluation, our scheme is
significant in practice.
INDEX TERMS Public key infrastructure, blockchain, revocation mechanism, privacy-preserving.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the development of information technology in recent
years, a lot of tasks have been fulfilled over network. More
and more people are becoming increasingly aware of the
security of their information transporting in network. So
an increasing number of websites serve over Secret Socket
Layer (SSL) or Transport Layer Security (TLS). They move
away from the plaintext HTTP protocol to securer HTTPS.
TLS is to guarantee the data confidentiality and integrity
for the vast majority of on-line connections. Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) is used to authenticate the identity of
web server by public key digital certificate. The certificates
issuing, update and revocation are authorized by a third
trusted party called Certificate Authority (CA).
However, real-world attacks have indicated the vulnera-
bility of the existing CA [1]. Intuitively, if a CAs has been
attacked, a malicious web server may get a verifiable certifi-
cate. Due to a corruption of the trusted root, tens of thousands
of clients may suffer losses in finance or personal privacy.
Aimed at this vulnerability, researches have done plenty of
research work. Through investigation, we classify these pro-
posals into two different types. The main idea of one group is
to disperse the trust of CAs and the other is to make the CAs’
behavior public visible. In the first group, multiple CAs or
other entities are brought in to assist certificate registration,
update, and revocation for the purpose of diminishing the trust
of CAs. For instance, in ARPKI, Basin et al. [2] introduce
multiple CAs to sign and validate certificates in a serial mode.
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In TriPKI, Chen et al. [1] utilize threshold signature among
CAs and DNSs to form a tripartite PKI system, in which, any
party with misbehavior will be detected by other parties. In
the second group, notaries, integrity log servers (ILS) or val-
idators are brought in to make the certificates public visible
and detect CAs’ misbehavior. For example, Google proposes
Certificate Transparency [3] which brings in ILSs to record
certificates for public audit. Continually, AKI [4], CIRT [5],
and Sovereign Key (SK) [6] and so on enhance the security
of PKI system based on notaries. Compared with the first
group, the second is more practical. Because the introduced
entities participating in certificate authorization increase the
computation complexity and any one of participants’ failure
may incur the failure of certificates authorization. However,
certificate operation behavior receiving public audit makes
the misbehavior detectable quickly.
Inspired by the characteristics of blockchain, such
as decentralization, public audit and tamper-proof, some
schemes based on blockchain are presented to make behavior
related to certificate operation public visible, for instance,
IKP [7], CertChain [8], Certcoin [9] and so on. We focus
on CertChain which is a typical scheme fallen into the sec-
ond group. The others will be described in section II. In
CertChain, Chen et al. [8] provide a public audit PKI system
with certificate operation history traceability and revocation
verification. What’s more, the certificates’ operations are
recorded in blockchain which provides public and self audit.
However, there are still three issues unsolved. 1) Confined
block size. The scale of certificates is up to 10 million or even
more, the size of a block is not enough to hold all the revoked
certificates even utilizing bloom filters. 2) Excessive data
redundancy.Responsible for recording the latest certificates’
status, valid and revoked certificates bloomfilters update with
new block generation. However, the block updating interval is
about 6.7s. The number of certificates whose status changed
in this slot is rare. In other words, these two types of bloom
filters are the same or hardly unchanged in continuous mul-
tiple blocks, which gives rise to excessive date redundancy.
3) Browsing privacy leak. As same as the conventional cer-
tificate status lookup by the way of OCSP (Online Certificate
Status Protocol), in CertChain, the objective web servers
accessed by Clients may be leaked when the clients request
for certificates revocation verification.
In this paper, aimed at these issues mentioned above,
we present a privacy-preserving blockchain-based certificate
status validation toward massive storage management, which
is called PBCert. In detail, we separate the storage and
control plane. In other words, all the revoked certificates are
stored in OCSP servers and the control information about
these revoked certificates are recorded in blockchain. By this
way, the block size cannot be restricted by the number of
revoked certificates and the data redundancy is negligible.
Aimed at the privacy-preserving in certificate status
validation, we design an obscure response to clients’ certifi-
cate revocation queries. In summary, we make the following
contributions:
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to
support large scale certificates management based on
blockchain with low storage cost.
• We separate the revocation certificates control and stor-
age to solve the issue of block size limitation and
the excessive revocation information redundancy in
blockchain.
• We design an obscure response method to preserve the
clients’ privacy when they validate whether the objective
certificates have been revoked from a OCSP server.
• We analyze the security of PBCert in theory. We also
implement a proof-of-concept prototype and evaluate
the performance of PBCert in practice.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II reviews the literature related to the PKI.
In section III, we give a description about the background
of PBCert and the preliminaries. We present the details of
our PBCert in section IV, and analyze the security of PBCert
in section V. Section VI evaluates the performance of this
scheme. Finally, we conclude this paper in section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
As the fundamental of secure network communication, PKI
has been paid more attention. Aimed at the following issues,
such as the single-point-of-failure, inefficient revocation
mechanisms, and the privacy-preserving in certificate status
validation, researchers have done a lot of work. Based on
these research results, we give amindmap about the overview
of secure PKI as shown in FIGURE 1. The details are given
below.
A. DISPERSE THE TRUST OF CA
Before establishing a secure TLS connection with a web
server, the client must verify the Certificate Authority (CA)
signature on this server’s certificate. CA as the third trust
party is responsible for signing and issuing certificates. All
the CAs form a trust chain from a root CA to multiple
intermediate CAs to commercial CAs. No matter which CA
is compromised, all the certificates issued by it after it been
controlled cannot be trusted. Therefore, the intuitive method
to solve this issue is to disperse the trust of CA. Basin et al. [2]
put forward ARPKI to decrease the trust of one CA by
introducing several CAs transfer the trust. In detail, these CAs
receive, check, sign and send the certificates to the next CA in
line. Nevertheless, this trust transference model is inefficient.
If one CA is compromised, the process of certificate registra-
tion may need to restart. Chen et al. [1] design a tripartite PKI
system called TriPKI by bringing in the DNSs and Integrity
Log servers (ILSs) to assist CA in managing certificates.
Through the threshold signature algorithm among multiple
entities, the system can tolerate the failure of a certain num-
ber of CAs or other entities. However, the implementation
cost of this scheme is expensive in practice. Syta et al. [10]
propose the CoSi which utilizes an existing cryptographic
multi-signature method to support thousands of witnesses via
signature aggregation. When a client verifies the aggregated
6118 VOLUME 7, 2019
S. Yao et al.: PBCert Status Validation Toward Mass Storage Management
FIGURE 1. Overview of secure PKI.
signature on the web server’s certificate, it needs to get a
collective public keys of the witnesses who participate in
signing this certificate. Therefore, ensuring the authenticity
of all witness’ identities and public keys will be the bottleneck
of each client.
B. CERTIFICATE PUBLIC VISIBLE
In conventional PKI, certificates are not public visible except
for the corresponding domains and CAs, so a malicious web
server’s certificate signed by a compromised CA is difficult
to be detected. Therefore, in 2013, Google firstly propose
the Certificate transparency (CT) [3] which induces CT logs.
The logs record certificates in the form of merkle hash tree
which supports efficient proof of existing. Based on CT, a lot
of schemes are presented to reinforce the security of PKI
system. Ryan [5] put forward the Certificate Issuance and
Revocation Transparency (CIRT) to enhance CT with an effi-
cient revocation mechanism. Chen et al. [1], Basin et al. [2],
Kim et al. [4], and Ryan [5] are inspired by CT and bring in
the integrity log servers to record certificates and revocation
information. Yu et al. [11] propose a Distributed Transparent
Key Infrastructure (DTKI) which reduces the oligopoly of
service providers and allows verification of the behavior of
trusted entities.
C. CERTIFICATES REVOCATION ISSUES
OCSP stapling advocates that the certificate and its status
are stapling when a client and a web server establish
TLS connection. The clients neither passively download the
CRL nor actively request the OCSP server for certificates’
statuses. The web servers are responsible for providing
signed information for indicating the statuses of certificates.
Chen et al. [12] present a network-coding-based method
which can be used to issue revocation certificates in wire-
less mesh network. Schulman et al. [13] present a broadcast
system called RevCast, which disseminates revoked certifi-
cates in a timely and private manner. The CAs or revo-
cation servers push the revoked certificates to all clients
actively by FM radio. Indeed, this method preserves clients’
browsing privacy, but all clients must install FM radio
receiver terminals. Szalachowski et al. [14] propose PKISN
to solve the too-big-to-be-revoked problem triggered by an
attacked or compromised CA, which may lead to mas-
sive collateral damage. PKISN makes CAs to revoke their
own certificates after a certain point in time and to remain
previously-signed valid certificates. Larisch et al. [15] design
CRLite to aggregate revocation information and store them
in a space-efficient filter cascade structure without false pos-
itive rate. Rabieh et al. [16] also employ bloom filters for
certificate revocation in smart grid advanced metering infras-
tructure (AMI) communications. Chariton et al. [17] present
a CCSP to supplement OCSP and OCSP Stapling. In this
scheme, the revoked certificates are packed in a bitmap. Each
bit of the bitmap indicates the revocation status of a single
certificate. In order to decrease the storage and transmission
costs, the bitmap is compressed in space and time dimensions.
D. BLOCKCHAIN BASED CERTIFICATE MANAGEMENT
Inspired by the characteristics of blockchain, such as
the decentralization, public audit and tamper-proofing,
blockchain has been introduced in PKI system to solve some
issues. Fromknecht et al. [9] present the Certcoin to build
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TABLE 1. Comparison of different public key infrastructures based on security, availability and deployability.
a PKI that ensures identity retention. In other words, Cert-
coin prevents a web server from registering a public key
based on others identity registered already. The core idea
of this scheme is to maintain a public ledger of domains
and their associated public keys. Ali et al. [18] propose the
Blockstack which enables clients to register human-readable
names and associate public keys along with additional data
to these names. It does not need any central or trusted party.
Chen et al. [8] put forward the CertChain to make the cer-
tificate operations public and self audit. CertChain records
the history of each certificate operation from registration to
revocation. It also makes all revoked certificates public visi-
ble. Matsumoto and Reischuk [7] present Instant Karma PKI
(IKP) which stimulates CAs to correctly issue certificates
and detectors to quickly report unauthorized certificates.
They design domain certificate policy and reaction policy
in smart contact for the purpose of defining and processing
misbehavior automatically. Kubilay et al. [19] design the Cer-
tLedger which is an architecture with certificate transparency
and revocation transparency based on blockchain. Axon and
Goldsmith [20] consider a privacy-aware blockchain-based
PKI called PB-PKI. It provides unlinkable key updates and
user-controlled disclosure. Al-Bassam presents an alternative
PKI system based on a web-of-trust model and a smart con-
tract on the Ethereum blockchain. It is used to detect the rogue
certificates when they are published. Szalachowski [22] puts
forward PADVA (Persistent andAccountable DomainValida-
tion) which combines the advantages of previous works and
leverages a blockchain to provide new features.
E. COMPARISON
In this part, we give a comparison about different PKI
schemes based on security, availability, and deployability as
shown in TABLE 1. For security entry, we pay attention to the
classical attack, the cost of a successful attack, data security,
and the privacy-preserving. Next, we give a comparison about
the availability entry. In this entry, what we firstly consider is
how long the period for a certificate operation cannot work
after a CA or Log server is compromised. Then, the mis-
behavior detection, reaction and incentive mechanisms are
taken into consideration. The certificate history traceability
and revocation efficiency are worthy of attention. At last,
we focus on the deployability of these different schemes. The
main concern is that whether the entities need to be changed
based on the traditional PKI system.
III. BACKGROUND AND DESIRED PROPERTIES
A. CERTCHAIN DESIGN
We review the CertChain [8] in more detail for two reasons.
First, our scheme is inspired by CertChain’s design and
employs some of its concepts. Second, our scheme addresses
several shortcomings in CertChain. In CertChain, Chen et al.
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design a certificate management based on blockchain, which
supports public audit and efficient revocation checking.
In this scheme, the interactive information flows of certificate
operations involve following three entities:
1 Certificate authorities (CAs) are responsible for issu-
ing X.509 certificates to authenticate domains and
generating certificate operations which are stored in
blockchain by bookkeepers.
2 Bookkeepers maintain the blockchain and record the
certificate operations and revocation information in
blockchain.
3 Domains are web servers request certificates from CA
for TLS connection with clients.
A certificate operation (registration, update, and revoca-
tion) is launched from a domain to a CA (certificate revoca-
tion operation can be initiated by a CA) through the operation
request. The CA signs the certificate contained in the request,
and generates an operation then sends it to a bookkeeper. The
bookkeeper stores it into the blockchain and returns the block
height to the CA. The signed certificate and block height are
sent to the domain.
In order to provide public audit, the authors design a
data structure called CertOper to express the certificate
operation. The format of CertOper is similar to the format
of the standard X.509 certificate. It contains some new fields
such as operation type, timestamp & notafter, last operation
height and so on. All certificate operations corresponding to
each domain make up an operation chain for public audit,
which reflects the integrated operation history.
For the purpose of efficient revocation validation in
blockchain, the authors design the DCBF (dual counting
bloom filters) to record all the revocation information in
the latest block. Via DCBF, a client requests an arbitrary
bookkeeper to check whether the target certificate is revoked
or not.
CertChain weakness. Storing certificate operations bene-
fits the public and self audit indeed, however, to the best of our
knowledge, the revocation information stored in blockchain is
not the best solution. The forward traceability is the inherent
characteristic of blockchain, but certificate revocation opera-
tion always follows the registration or update. It is easy to get
the previous operation according to the current status, how-
ever, it’s hard to get latest status of a certificate. In CertChain,
the authors adopt a method that records all certificates sta-
tuses in the latest block. By this way, anyone at any time
can get the revocation status from the latest block. However,
the size of one block is limited while there is no upper limit
of the number of certificates. When the amount of revoked
certificates reaches up to ten million or even more, the size of
DCBF will exceed the capacity of one block. What’s more,
since the interval of time between two blocks is too short,
the DCBFs in continuous blocks are the same or negligible
changed. In other words, the storage space utilization of the
whole blockchain is too low.
What’s more, in CertChain, clients’ browsing privacy in
revocation query has not been considered. As well as in
conventional PKI, during the process of certificate status
query, the client needs to send the objective certificate to a
bookkeeper which may be an honest but curious entity.
B. ADVERSARY MODEL
In our scheme, the goals of an adversary attacking PKI
system are: 1) compromising a CA without being detected;
2) issuing unauthorized certificate for malicious domain;
3) deceiving clients with an inauthentic certificate revocation
status. We assume that an adversary is able to forge, modify,
eavesdrop message. It can compromise any entity but not all.
The OCSP servers are honest but curious.
Moreover, we make some standard cryptographic assump-
tions, such as, the adversary cannot forge signatures without
the target server’s private key. It cannot control more than
51% bookkeepers.
C. DESIRED PROPERTIES
Here are the properties that we expect of a satisfactory cer-
tificate management system:
• large-scale: The scale of certificates does not affect the
storage property of blockchain.
• Privacy: Clients can obtain the accurate certificate sta-
tus information without sacrificing their privacy.
• Authenticity: Only legitimate parties can create a revo-
cation message for a certificate, but this message can be
verified by everyone.
• Transparency: Revocation information must be pub-
licly accessible and persistent. If a revoked certificate
is successfully issued, it is impossible for an interested
party to claim that the certificate is still valid.
IV. PBCert DESIGN
A. OVERVIEW
PBCert retains most good characteristics in CertChain, such
as public and self audit, certificate history traceability and
the fairness consensus. At the same time, it makes up for the
deficiencies of block size limitation and privacy-preserving
in certificate status validation. Based on CertChain, we bring
in the OCSP servers for certificate revocation. We improve
the function of OCSP server in conventional PKI and make it
compatible with CertChain. In details, we separate the revo-
cation information’s storage and control plane and design an
efficient obscure response to revocation query for the purpose
of preserving clients’ privacy.
The framework of PBCert is shown in FIGURE 2. There
are five types of entities in our scheme including CAs, book-
keepers, domains, OCSPs, and clients. A CA is responsi-
ble for certificate issuing, update, revoking, and operation
generating. Bookkeepers maintain the blockchain and store
certificate operations. OCSP servers take charge of storing the
revoked certificates and responding certificate status query
from clients. Domains and clients establish security connec-
tions through domains’ certificates issued by CAs. Clients
can validate the certificate operation and status from an
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FIGURE 2. Framework of PBCert.
arbitrary bookkeeper. The detailed certificate operations will
be given in the following sections.
B. CERTIFICATE REGISTRATION AND UPDATE
1) REGISTRATION AND UPDATE FLOW
Generally, the certificate registration is often launched from
a domain to a CA. In practical, the CA needs to check a
lot of information related to the domain’s identity off-line
and this step is outside of considering in this paper. We
assume the domain is a legitimate web server. The flow of
certificate registration and update is shown in FIGURE 3.
The CA receives the domain’s registration request, it signs
the certificate and generates a certificate registration oper-
ation called CertOper (details about CertOper will be
described in IV-B2). Then, the CA sends CertOper to an
arbitrary bookkeeper. The bookkeeper broadcasts this mes-
sage to all others. When a bookkeeper is selected as a leader,
it records all buffered certificate operations into the new block
and broadcasts the new blockchain. If these records have been
confirmed, each bookkeeper returns the block height of the
corresponding certificate operation to the CA. The CA sends
FIGURE 3. Certificate registration and update flow. In this figure,
CA denotes certificate authority, BK denotes the bookkeeper. All
bookkeepers maintain the blockchain.
a response to the domain’s request with a signed certificate
and the corresponding height value.
The process of certificate update operation is similar with
registration. In general, the CA does not need to check the
domain’s identity information, and sometimes, the CA only
expands the expiration data. So, we do not give unnecessary
details about the process of update operation.
2) DATA PROCESS
In PBCert, the certificate operation follows the design-
ing in CertChain. It is a new data structure defined to
express three certificate operation including registration,
update, and revocation. The format of it is similar with
the standard X.509 certificate. Besides the traditional fields
such as Version No., Signature Algorithm ID,
Signature Value, Extension Field, it also con-
tains some customized fields including Subject Name,
Operation Type, Time & NotAfter, Current
certificate hash, Last Operation Height.
Especially, through the Last operation Height,
the certificate operation history of each domain can be trace-
able. This characteristic is in favor of public and self audit.
C. CERTIFICATE REVOCATION
1) REVOCATION FLOW
When a domain’s private key is leaked, the domain needs to
apply for revoking the previous certificate and request a new
one. The certificate revocation flow is shown in FIGURE 4.
A domain applies for certificate revocation from a CA. The
CA sends the revoked certificate to OCSP server. In the
meantime, it generates the CertOper with the type of revo-
cation, signs and sends it to a bookkeeper. As the same with
registration and update operation, this CertOper will be
recorded into the blockchain, and the block height will be
sent to the OCSP server rather than the CA. Then, the OCSP
server generates CertRevo (details about CertRevo will
be described in IV-C2) and add this information into the
merkle hash tree. The root of this tree will be written in the
latest block.
FIGURE 4. Certificate revocation flow. It is worth to note that certificate
revocation can be launched by a CA directly. In this setting, the first
information flow can be ignored.
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TABLE 2. Structure of a CertRevo.
2) SEPARATION OF CONTROL AND STORAGE PLANE
PBCert separates the revoked certificate control and storage
planes. The control plane consists of certificate operations
and all OCSP servers’ root hashes related to the information
of all revoked certificates. The storage plane is responsible for
storing the detail information of all revoked certificates issued
by CAs. We define a new data structure called CertRevo
to describe the information of each revoked certificate. It is
designed in the format exhibited in TABLE 2 and all the fields
are explained as follows. Each CertRevo is signed by the
public keys of the OCSP server.
• Version Number,Signature Algorithm ID,
Signature Value, Extension Field are the
same as X.509 certificate.
• Subject Name: the name of a domain whose certifi-
cate has been revoked;
• Revocation Operator height: the block
height of the subject’s certificate revocation operation;
• Timestamp: the time when this certificate has been
revoked;
• Certificate Hash: the hash of a subject domain’s
certificate which is used for the process of certificate
revocation validation;
As shown in FIGURE 5, in the control plane,
the blockchain works for two purposes. The one is to store
the sequence of certificate operations. The other is to record
root hashes from all OCSP servers. Root hashes are treated
as special certificate operations stored in the latest block.
In the storage plane, all revoked certificates are stored in
OCSP servers, and they are signed by the key of the respective
owner of a CA. By storing revoked certificates outside of
the blockchain, our scheme can provide revocation query for
large scale of certificates. Clients do not need to trust the
storage plane because they can verify the integrity of the
revoked certificates in the control plane. In order to insure
the tamper-proofing of CertRevos, a merkle hash tree is




When a client wants to establish a secure TLS connection
with a domain, it will receive the domain’s certificate in
the handshake protocol. Then it needs to check whether the
FIGURE 5. Separation of control and storage plane. The control plane is
maintained by bookkeepers, and the storage plane is maintained by
every OCSP server.
certificate is valid from four aspects: 1© signature verifi-
cation, 2© expiration date checking, 3©existence checking
(the certificate operation must be stored in blockchain), 4©
revocation query.
The information flow of certificate validation is shown in
FIGURE 6. The former two steps are accomplished locally
by a client via a conventional way, the latter two steps have
recourse to an OCSP server and a bookkeeper. Therefore,
we introduce the latter two steps in details. According to the
operation height value, the clients query an arbitrary book-
keeper for the existing of corresponding certificate operation.
For the last step, the client sends a request of the revoca-
tion ReqRev to an OCSP server. The former looks up the
database and gets some revoked certificates satisfied client’s
requirement. Through an obscurely processing, the OCSP
server gives a response to the client. The processing detail
is described in IV-D2. If all four steps validation are correct,
the client can communicate with the domain securely. Note
that the last two steps can be executed in parallel.
2) PRIVACY-PRESERVING IN REVOCATION QUERY
In order to preserving clients’ privacy in revocation query,
we design an obscure response to a client’s request. From
FIGURE 6. Certificate validation flow. Aimed at the client certificate
existence checking, it looks up the corresponding certificate operation
according to the block height attached in client’s checking information.
Then, it gives the certificate existence response to the client.
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FIGURE 7. Certificate revocation obscure request and response flow.
the validation flow in IV-D1, the client sends the information
about the desired certificate to OCSP server. In this step,
the client needs to get the certificate hash h and captures
a certain length of the hash value that is h′. As shown in
FIGURE 7, after receiving h′, the OCSP server consults the
hash_table to get the all the certificates whose hashes value
match h′. Then it adds these certificates into a table called
h′_table and inserts all of them into a bloom filter called
BF . The revocation information (BF, h′_table) is sent to the
client. The client firstly checks whether the hash h of the
objective certificate is in the bloom filter. If it is not in, then
the objective certificate in valid. Otherwise, the client needs to
look up h′_table. If h is in, the objective certificate is revoked,
otherwise it is valid. Note that, because of the false positive
rate of bloom filter, if h is in the BF , checking the h′_table
is necessary. In addition, if the OCSP server finds none of
certificates matching h′, it responds to the clients that the
objective certificate is valid directly. It is worth to note that
the bloomfilter is used to increase the efficiency of revocation
status request and response.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Theorem 1: The adversary cannot attack a CA to issue a
certificate which could pass the certificate validation for a
malicious web server without being detected.
Proof: The goal of an adversary is to issue a certifi-
cate for a malicious web server by controlling a CA. This
type of certificate is called as the unauthorized certificate.
In PBCert, a certificate that can pass the validation process
must satisfy four conditions displayed in certificate valida-
tion flow in IV-D1. Because of the third step, all the cer-
tificate operations must be stored in blockchain to receive
public audit. The malicious web server’s unauthorized cer-
tificate issued by a compromised CA is also visible in public.
The manager of a CA can consult the whole blockchain to
detect whether there is any unauthorized certificate issued by
itself but the identity of the subject has not been checked.
If there are some authorized certificate operations recorded
in blockchain, the involved CA may be attacked. Then the
CA needs to determine the time of the attack. More precisely,
this time is when an unauthorized certificate is observed in the
blockchain. All the certificates issued after attacking need to
be checked.
Therefore, setting a rational frequency of self audit,
the attack against CA will be detected quickly.
Theorem 2: The adversary cannot personate a legal web
server to get a certificate that could pass the certificate vali-
dation without being detected.
Proof: In the conventional PKI system, an adversary can
personate a legal web server by registering a public key under
this web server’s already-registered identity. This attack is
difficult to detect. Because all the certificates are not public
visible. In PBCert, any domain can scan the blockchain to
detect the impersonation attack via self audit.
Theorem 3: The adversary cannot forge the certificate sta-
tus to deceive clients without being detected.
Proof: From the certificate validation flow in IV-D1,
a certificate’s status is valid or revoked is determined by a
OCSP server’s response. An adversary may disturb the TLS
connection between a client and web server. For instance,
the adversary can prevent a web server to provide legal ser-
vice by issuing a forge revocation status to clients. It also
can change a revoked certificate’s status to make a malicious
web server whose certificate has been revoked still provide
service.
In PBCert, each revoked certificate is stored by the data
structure called CertRevo which records the revocation
operation in blockchain. From FIGURE 5, we can see that
these revocation items are stored in a merkle hash tree, and
the root of this tree is recorded in blockchain. Since each
CertRevo contains the block height of the revocation oper-
ation stored in blockchain, the accurate status of a certificate
can be traced by the corresponding operation. And all the
revocation information cannot be tampered. In some setting,
in order to improve clients’ website experience, the browser
vendor makes clients browse the webpage before revocation
validation. When the certificate is detected to be revoked by
background, a warning pop-up will be given by the browser.
In PBCert, the clients can establish the TLS connection
when the certificate passes the revocation validation. And the
accurate status confirmation of the certificate is detected in
background. If the certificate is revoked, the TLS connection
must be terminated.
Theorem 4: Compared with conventional OCSP and
Certchain, PBCert can preserve clients’ privacy without los-
ing the certificate status validation efficiency.
Proof: In conventional OCSP revocation mechanism,
clients get the accurate certificate status with sacrificing the
privacy of accessing web server, as well as in CertChain. In
PBCert, the queried certificate has been preprocessed by a
one-way hash function and captured n bits. After receiving
a certificate status request, the OCSP server cannot recover
the integrity certificate or bits. Through a hash matching
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from the whole table of revoked certificates, the OCSP can
get a subtable and generate a bloom filter to insert these
matching certificates. A reasonable value of n can guarantee
the confusion of a subtable. Even if the number of elements
in subtable is small, the OCSP cannot confirm the objective
certificate. For instance, if the required certificate is valid,
it cannot appear in the matched revoked certificates list. Note
that, the computation complexity of the objective certificate
lookup in PBCert is O(n) as well as in conventional OCSP.
Compared with CertChain, the efficiency of certificate status
validation depends on the third step (operation existence
checking). The bloom filter is used to improve the efficiency
of status confirmation for clients. Therefore, PRCert preserve
clients’ privacy with efficient status validation.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. IMPLEMENTATION
We have developed a prototype implementation of PBCert.
We implement the CA with OpenSSL. The main process
is written in Node.js. Each CA provides services includ-
ing certificate registration, update, revocation, lookup and
validation by calling the uniform REST API interface.
The bookkeeper is established by Ethereum. The services
related to the blockchain operations call the main interfaces
such as:(1) sendTransaction, (2)filter.watch,
(3)getTransactin, (4)getBlock and so on. We imple-
ment the domain by the express framework. Themain process
is written in Node.js. The domain’s network load balancing
is achieved by nginx reverse proxy. A client is built by
Firefox Developer Edition. We install the designed plug-in
for the certificate validation service with an OCSP server
and a bookkeeper. Based on the existing Online Certificate
State Protocol (OCSP), we design a new data structure called
CertRevo which is defined and coded by ASN.1(Abstract
Syntax Notation One). In this prototype, the bloom filter and
the merkle hash tree are realized by calling the nmp source.
The certificate operation calls the X.509 library. All the enti-
ties connect with each other by a secure TLS connection.
For simplicity, entities of the same party are simulated in
one PC. Hence, a CA is implemented by four virtual CPUs,
16G RAM, and Ubuntu LTS 16.04 64bit operation system,
as well as the domain and OCSP server. A bookkeeper is
implemented with 2 virtual CPUs, 8GB RAM and Ubuntu
LTS 16.04.
B. A PERFORMANCE COMPARISON OF REVOCATION
MECHANISM BETWEEN PBCert AND CONVENTIONAL PKI
In the revocation process, PBCert is a trade-off between CRL
and OCSP. So in this part, we will make a comparison with
these two schemes.
In terms of storage cost, the average size of a CRL in
conventional PKI is about 51KB [23]. In PBCert, the size
of the h′_table is smaller than the CRL intuitively. Because
the h′_table is a small subset of all the revoked certificates.
For example, a CRL with the size of 45KB contains about
840 revoked certificates. When we set the value of n as 8,
we can measure that the size of the h′_table is about 112 Byte
and the size of bloom filter is 9 Byte. For another, if the
CRL is 1.2MB, it contains about 499675 revoked certificates.
When the value of n is 16, the sizes of h′_table and bloom
filter are 176 Byte and 14 Byte respectively.
Since the size of h′_table is adjustable, from TABLE 3,
we can find that the size is smaller, the objective certificate is
more obvious, and the risk of privacy leakage is higher, vice
versa. Therefore, getting a rational value of n is essential.
TABLE 3. The number of revoked certificates in h′_table with different n
under different total number of revoked certificates.
In terms of the computation cost, we measure the time for
an OCSP server to get the certificates matching h′ and to
build a bloom filter for these selected revoked certificates.
We assume that no matter how large the number of revoked
certificates in an OCSP server, through the rational value of
n, the h′_table consists of several hundred certificates. In
this process, we can find that creating of h′_table produces
few latencies. Because the subtable is built during traversing
the whole hash table composed of all revoked certificates.
A bloom filter is built by the hashes of these revoked certifi-
cates in h′_table and this process costs about 10ms. The aver-
age latency of revocation validation in conventional OCSP is
about 250ms [23]. Therefore, the delay of our scheme is the
nearly the same, so this result is acceptable.
C. THE PERFORMANCE INDEXES IN THE PROCESS OF
CERTIFICATE VALIDATION
For a PKI system, the efficiency of certificate validation
process is the most concerned issue. Because it affects the
user experience in the website browsing. Therefore, we will
measure the performance of certificate validation from three
aspects.
Firstly, the storage and communication costs of certificate
validation are determined by the size of the (h′_table,BF).
In our implementation, the average size of (h′_table,BF)
is about 4KB with a h′_table containing several hundred of
items. Compared with the CRL in conventional PKI, our
result is more efficient in storage cost.
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Secondly, due to the OSCP server’s obscure response,
the client needs to determine the accurate status of the objec-
tive certificate. The main computation cost is reflected in
the lookup of the bloom filter and h′_table. Considering the
signature verification delay and the expiration date checking
latency, the computation cost of a client is about 9 ms. For a
client, this process delay is insignificant.
Thirdly, from validation flow IV-C1, step 3 and step 4 in
certificate validation process involve communication from
a client to a bookkeeper and an OCSP server. These two
steps can be carried out in parallel. That is to say, the net-
work latency is determined by the step with longer delay.
In step 3, according to a given certificate hash and height
value, a bookkeeper looking up a certificate operation will
cost about 443 ms. And the result feeding back costs about
3ms. Therefore, the existing validation from a bookkeeper
costs about 446 ms. In step 4, the OCSP needs to generate
a h′_table and a bloom filter according to a given h′, and a
client must query the bloom filter even the h′_table to get
the accurate status of a certificate. From the above results,
OCSP needs about 135 ms to generate a subtable and a bloom
filter. The client needs about 147 ms to get the status from
(BF, h′_table). Therefore, considering the network delay,
the latency is about 283 ms.
In conclusion, the certificate validation delay is about
459 ms. This result is comparable to the CertChain.
Because the most time-consumption steps are certificate
existence checking. In other words, we improve the perfor-
mance in storage and privacy-preserving without more time-
consumption.
D. COMPARED WITH CERTCHAIN
In this part, we focus on the size of one block and the
blockchain with fixed number of blocks. We make a com-
parison between CertChain and PBCert under the setting that
the scale of certificates is about one million and the revoked
certificates is in the range of 1% to 10%.
From FIGURE 8, we can find that the block size of PBCert
is stable under an incremental rate of revoked certificates,
but it grows notably in CertChain. The reason is that the
FIGURE 8. Under the setting with about one million certificates with
different rate of revoked certificates, the block size comparison between
PBCert and CertChain.
revoked certificates information is not recorded in blockchain
directly. Due to the separation of storage and control plane,
the revoked certificates are stored in OCSP server by the
merkle hash tree with the CertRevo as the leaf node. Only
the hash root treated as a special certificate operation stored
in the latest block. The number of root hashes is related to
the number of OCSP server which is not changed frequently.
But in CertChain, all revoked certificates are stored in the
latest block by two counting bloom filters. Even if the bloom
filter is an efficient storage structure, if the certificate scale
is as large as ten million or even more, the size of one block
is not enough to hold one counting bloom filter. Therefore,
the PBCert is more rational in the setting with large scale
certificates.
The FIGURE 9 reflects the size of blockchain in a cer-
tain number of blocks. We simulate a setting that the scale
of certificates is about one million and the rate of revoked
certificate is about 5%. The rate of certificate operations in
unit interval is uniform. In other word, the speed of block
generation is enough to contain the operations. In this setting,
we can find that the line of CertChain is increase more rapidly
than the line of PBCert. Therefore, the storage of blockchain
in PBCert is more efficient. For another, the data redundancy
degree is lighter. That is to say, even if an OCSP server
does not receive new revoked certificate in a block interval,
the new block only needs to restore the OCSP’s root value.
By contrast, CertChain must rebuild the whole dual counting
bloom filter if only one certificate status changes.
FIGURE 9. Under the setting with about one million certificates and the
rate of revoked certificates is 5%, the accumulated size of blockchain in
incremental number of blocks.
In conclusion, we solve the issue of large scaled revoked
certificates and excessive data redundancy in blockchain. At
the same time, we preserve the clients’ browsing privacy.
And from the results, the improvement about CertChain is
meaningful.
VII. CONCLUSION
To solve the revoked certificate storage scale issue and
preserve clients’ privacy, we present a scalable certificate
revocation privacy-preserving PKI system in this paper.
In details, firstly, we separate the revoked certificates control
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and storage plane by bringing in the conventional OCSP
server. The OCSP servers store the revoked certificate in the
format of CertRevowhich is a new data structure related to
certificate revocation operation. They also maintain a merkle
hash tree related to all CertOper and store the root into
the blockchain. Secondly, we design an obscure response
to the clients’ revocation query for the purpose of privacy-
preserving. Through the security analysis and the experiment
evaluation, PBCert is significant in real world.
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